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Abstract 
High mineral and energy commodity prices shook world commodity markets from 2003 to 
2008. Taking three case study countries as examples, this paper shows that sub-Saharan 
African countries collected only relatively low tax revenues from the extractive sector, 
unlike such classical mining countries as Australia. 
Corruption and patronage in the granting of concessions and in tax administration cause 
low implicit tax rates. Poor conditions impede investments in downstream processing in-
dustries and additional production. As a consequence, sales revenues and hence the tax 
base are relatively lower than in Australia, for example. 
We present estimates of potential tax revenues for the three case study countries and for 
sub-Saharan Africa as a whole. Applying Australia’s implicit tax rate to sub-Saharan Af-
rica’s sales revenues, tax revenues in sub-Saharan Africa could have been equivalent to 35 
per cent of official development assistance (ODA) from 2003 to 2008. Finally, we suggest 
some policy options for resource-rich countries and donor countries that may enable tax 
revenues to be acquired from the extractive sector in the long term. 
 
  
Contents 
 
Abbreviations 
Summary 1 
1 Introduction 3 
2. A booming extractive sector, but low tax revenues 5 
2.1 Sub-Saharan Africa 5 
2.2 Zambia 7 
2.3 Namibia 7 
2.4 Ghana 8 
2.5 Australia 8 
3. Potential tax revenues 9 
4. The challenge of collecting tax revenues from the extractive sector 10 
4.1 Geology 10 
4.2 Investment conditions 12 
4.3 Tax policy and administration 16 
4.3.1 Key features of the taxing of the extractive sector 16 
4.3.2 Awarding licences and negotiating concessions 18 
4.3.3 Tax collection 20 
5. The political economy of reforming the tax administration of the 
extractive sector 21 
6. Policy options 23 
6.1 Resource-rich sub-Saharan African countries 23 
6.2 Donor countries and international development agencies 24 
 
Bibliography   27 
Annex 31 
 
 
Figures 
Figure 1: Production of mineral and energy commodities in sub-Saharan African 
 countries as a share of global mine production in 2008 6 
Figure 2: Total annual export revenues from mineral and energy commodities for  
 38 countries in sub-Saharan Africa and metal (dotted line) and fuel  
 (broken line) commodity price indices (2005 = 100) (current US$) 6 
Figure 3: Foreign direct investment in sub-Saharan African countries 7 
Figure 4: Resources and reserves are not a stock but a flow variable depending on 
 economic costs, technological innovation and discoveries 10 
Figure 5: Mineral potential of Australia and selected sub-Saharan African countries 11 
Figure 6: Attractiveness of government policies and regulations for the extractive  
 sector in Australia and selected sub-Saharan African countries 12 
Figure 7: Infrastructure as a deterrent to investment in the extractive sector in  
 Australia and selected sub-Saharan African countries 14 
Figure 8: Taxation regime as a deterrent to investment in the extractive sector in 
 Australia and selected sub-Saharan African countries 15 
Figure 9: Uncertainty concerning the administration, interpretation and enforcement 
 of existing regulations as a deterrent to investment in the extractive sector 
 in Australia and selected sub-Saharan African countries 15 
 
Tables 
Table 1: Long-term foreign-currency sovereign credit ratings of Australia and 
 selected sub-Saharan African countries 13 
Table 2: Data Sub-Saharan Africa 33 
Table 3: Data Zambia 34 
Table 4: Data Namibia 35 
Table 5: Data Ghana 36 
Table 6: Data Australia 37 
 
Abbreviations 
DR Congo Democratic Republic of Congo 
EITI Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative  
IASB International Accounting Standard Board 
IFRS International financial reporting standards 
ITR Implicit tax rate 
km2 Square kilometre 
KPCS Kimberley Process 
ODA Net official development assistance and official aid received 
ODI Overseas Development Institute 
PGMs Platinum group metals 
PwC PricewaterhouseCoopers AG 
PWYP Publish What You Pay 
UN United Nations 
UNCTAD United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
UNDP United Nations Development Programme 
UNSTAT United Nations Statistics Division 
USA United States of America 
 
 
 
  
Let the good times roll? Raising tax revenues from the extractive sector in sub-Saharan Africa ........ 
German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE) 1 
Summary 
High prices of mineral and energy commodities shook world commodity markets from 
2003 to 2008. Sub-Saharan Africa generally failed to seize the opportunity of collecting 
significant amounts of tax revenues from the extractive sector during this commodity 
boom, unlike such classical mining countries as Australia. 
The extractive sector in sub-Saharan countries experienced strong sales revenues, and 
there were high inflows of direct investments into the sector. At the same time, the data 
from three case study countries indicates that even relatively stable countries like Zambia, 
Namibia and Ghana profited no more than moderately from tax revenues during the com-
modity boom. Compared to Australia, the three case study countries achieved lower im-
plicit tax rates and lower sales revenues per km2. 
The first reason for low tax revenues is corruption in the granting of concessions and in 
tax administration. The underlying phenomena of rent-seeking and patronage cause poor 
tax collection and a lack of skill in negotiations on concessions, thus leading to low im-
plicit tax rates (ITRs).1 
The second reason is the poor state of investment conditions in most sub-Saharan African 
countries, which impedes investment in the extractive sector and downstream processing 
industry. This causes relatively low sales revenues and so a low tax base. 
The potential for tax revenues is much higher. Applying Australia’s implicit tax rate to sub-
Saharan Africa’s sales revenues, tax revenues in sub-Saharan Africa could have been 
equivalent to about 35 per cent of official development assistance (ODA) during the period 
from2003 to 2008. If Australia’s implicit tax rate and sales revenues per km2 are applied, tax 
revenues of sub-Saharan African countries could have reached 83 per cent of ODA. 
The extractive sector in most countries consists of a small number of firms generating high 
sales revenues. On the one hand, this makes the sector highly vulnerable to corruption. On 
the other hand, improving the tax administration for this small number of firms can lead to 
substantial increases in tax revenues. 
The political will of the government concerned to reform the tax administration is essen-
tial if tax revenues are to be increased. The political economy of corruption and the incen-
tives for agents must be analysed for a country-specific reform. 
Resource-rich sub-Saharan African countries could set up autonomous administrative units 
to grant licences and collect taxes in the extractive sector. To ensure freedom from patron-
age and to improve skills, they could employ international consultants in these units in the 
short run. In the long run, governments could train new local staff in close cooperation with 
international consultancies and implement strong anti-corruption measures. Finally, they 
could change national laws to make the granting of licences transparent, to stop secret tax 
deals and to oblige extractive industry companies to make their payments public. 
                                                 
1 ITRs are essentially ratios that measure aggregate revenue from one or more taxes (here: corporate income 
taxes from the extractive sector and royalties) as a per centage of some aggregate tax base (here: sales reve-
nues from minerals and fuels). ITRs are sometimes referred to as average or effective tax rates. 
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Donor countries and international development agencies could make the data required for 
the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) reports mandatory for their annual 
country assessments. They could support resource-rich countries with funds for independ-
ent technical assistance and strengthen their cooperation on capacity-building in geologi-
cal know-how and tax administration. Where tax revenues in countries with a flourishing 
extractive industry continue to be low, donor countries could rethink their engagement and 
possibly redirect it elsewhere. Finally, donor countries could lobby for changes in interna-
tional accounting standards to attain the disclosure of payments by the extractive industry 
to the government on a country-by-country basis. They could require that national legisla-
tion ensure these standards are met by companies and subsidiaries listed on the national 
stock exchange. 
As theoretical and empirical research on tax administration in the extractive sector is far 
from conclusive, the study and these recommendations serve only as a starting point for 
further research and discussion. 
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1 Introduction 
High prices of mineral and energy commodities shook world commodity markets from 
2003 to 2008. China’s rise triggered enormous growth of demand while global supply was 
low owing to a lack of investment in the previous decade. As a consequence, prices of 
mineral and energy commodities rose by several hundred per cent and turned the terms of 
trade in favour of commodity-exporting countries.2 
Riding on this wave, such classical producers of minerals and fossil fuels as Australia, 
Canada and Saudi-Arabia benefited from the situation, generating high revenues from roy-
alties, corporate income taxes and other charges on the extractive sector. Some countries 
even managed to build up considerable sovereign wealth funds. 
Sub-Saharan African countries also hoped to seize the opportunities presented by this 
commodity boom. According to the United Nations Conference on Trade and Develop-
ment (UNCTAD), “the potentially most important direct contribution from mineral ex-
traction is the rise in host-country income, much of which takes the form of government 
revenue” (UNCTAD 2007). The extractive sector could provide these countries with the 
opportunity to raise domestic funds to finance such public goods as infrastructure, educa-
tion and basic health and so trigger further economic development. The international de-
velopment community has therefore placed such initiatives as the Extractive Industries 
Transparency Initiative (EITI) high on the development agenda.3 
This paper assesses the extent to which sub-Saharan African countries have seized the op-
portunity of raising tax revenues from the extractive sector, explains the main difficulties 
in generating tax revenues from the extractive sector and draws some initial conclusions 
for development policy. 
The findings for three case study countries show that it is likely that, compared to classical 
mining and quarrying countries, such as Australia, sub-Saharan African countries gener-
ally failed to take advantage of the commodity boom. 
If sub-Saharan African countries had achieved the same implicit tax rates and sales reve-
nues per km2 as such classical mining countries as Australia, their tax revenues from the 
extractive sector could have been significantly higher. It will be argued that it is important 
to look at the tax base, and especially  sales revenues, and the implicit tax rate if tax reve-
nues are to be effectively collected in the long run. 
This paper focuses on tax revenues from the extractive sector. The extractive sector is de-
fined as all entities engaged in exploring for and discovering mineral, oil and natural gas 
deposits, developing them and extracting the minerals, oil and natural gas. As the value 
chain is often complex, it may also include a first processing stage. Tax revenue from the 
extractive industry means income available to the government from royalties, corporate 
taxes and taxes on windfall profits. Not included, owing to a lack of data, are other taxes 
                                                 
2 The title of this working paper draws on a PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) publication on the extractive 
sector in 2006 entitled “Let the good times roll”. 
3 See for example the Monterrey Consensus (UN 2002) and the Doha Declaration on Financing for De-
velopment (UN 2008). 
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and charges, such as payroll tax, and dividend payments to the government due to its free 
share of the stock of the various mining companies. Royalties and corporate income taxes 
are nevertheless the two most important contributors of government revenue from the ex-
tractive sector. 
This paper does not refer to the spending side, such as effective forms of revenue man-
agement or broader economically beneficial effects, such as employment. It also goes be-
yond the scope of this paper to assess the damage done by the extractive sector to the envi-
ronment and to the livelihoods of local communities. This includes the lack of land for 
farming, soil and water contamination, air pollution, deforestation, forced resettlements, 
physical damage to dwellings and an unsafe living environment. Nor is any account taken 
of small-scale and artisanal mining. The overall contribution made or damage done by the 
extractive sector to the sustainable development of a mineral- and fuel-producing country 
cannot therefore be assessed. 
The data presented in this paper are based on the best available sources, such as the World 
Bank, the United Nations (UN) and national statistics. Nevertheless, it should be noted 
that sales revenue data are often inconsistent and flawed owing to inadequate data collec-
tion, smuggling and fraud. It is also difficult to obtain comparable data on tax revenues 
from the extractive sector. Tax codes and accounting standards differ from one country to 
another and are highly complex. Corporate income taxes paid by mining firms are often 
published separately from those of companies outside the extractive sector. Many special 
tax agreements between firms and governments are not published at all. Overall, the data 
presented are more in the nature of orders of magnitude and should be viewed with cau-
tion. All the data in this report are given in current US dollars unless otherwise stated. 
As it is especially difficult to obtain tax data from the extractive sector for sub-Saharan 
Africa as a whole, we present them only for three case study countries, namely Ghana, 
Namibia and Zambia. Unfortunately, only limited data are available on such less stable 
countries as the DR Congo and Sierra Leone. It has therefore been decided not to concen-
trate on the extreme cases, but rather to cover countries which are representative of the 
situation in the average African country and are neither examples of outstanding govern-
ance of the extractive sector, such as Botswana, or worst cases, such as the DR Congo and 
Sierra Leone. At the same time, the choice of case study countries covers a broad range of 
mineral products. We have chosen Australia to be the classical mining country for compari-
son with sub-Saharan African countries. Like most of the latter, Australia produces very lit-
tle oil and exports most of its mining and quarrying products (see ABARE 2009, 6–7). 
The paper begins by looking at the export revenues of and foreign direct investment in-
flows into the extractive sector. It then assesses the tax revenues obtained from the extrac-
tive sector in three case study countries and compares them with the equivalent figures for 
Australia. Estimates of potential tax revenues are presented. It is explained why it is so 
difficult for countries to obtain tax revenues from the extractive sector, and some policy 
options are presented. 
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2. A booming extractive sector, but low tax revenues 
The commodity boom in the last few years has triggered an enormous rise in the sales 
revenues of the extractive sector and extensive foreign direct investment in sub-Saharan 
African countries. In the same period, tax revenues from the extractive sector have been 
quite modest in our three case study countries. 
The following reviews sales revenues, foreign direct investment, tax revenues and implicit 
tax rates (ITRs) in sub-Saharan Africa (where possible) and the three case study countries 
during the commodity boom from 2003 to 2008. These figures are compared with those 
for Australia. The disaggregated data and their sources can be found in the annex. 
Export revenues are used instead of sales revenues from mineral and energy production in 
sub-Saharan Africa, Zambia and Ghana where data on sales revenues are not published. 
As these countries export almost their entire mineral and fuel production, export revenues 
serve as a reliable and comparable substitute for sales revenues. 
Publicly available data on tax revenue differ widely. This paper presents at least the reve-
nues from corporate income taxes, windfall taxes (where applicable) and royalties, the 
most important taxes for the extractive industry in each case study country. 
ITRs are essentially ratios that measure aggregate revenue from one or more taxes (here: 
corporate income taxes paid by the extractive sector and royalties) as a percentage of some 
aggregate tax base (here: sales revenues from minerals and fuels). ITRs are sometimes re-
ferred to as an average or effective tax rate (see also OECD 2001). 
2.1 Sub-Saharan Africa 
After agriculture, the extractive sector is the most important economic sector in most sub-
Saharan African countries. Exports of mineral products and fuels account for up to 38 per 
cent of total exports in sub-Saharan Africa (UNSTAT 2010; World Bank 2010). As Figure 
1 shows, sub-Saharan African countries are major producers especially of platinum group 
metals (PGMs), cobalt, chromites, gold and other minerals. Fuels have played a minor, but 
growing, role in recent years. 
Figure 2 shows that export revenues from mineral and energy commodities have increased 
in line with the prices of metals and fuels. During the commodity boom from 2003 to 
2008, annual export revenues almost tripled to US$ 139 billion in 2008. In total, sub-
Saharan African countries exported minerals and fuels with a total value of US$ 482 bil-
lion from 2003 to 2008 (UNSTAT 2010; World Bank 2010). Sub-Saharan Africa pro-
duced an average of US$ 3312 worth of minerals and fuels per km2 per year. 
Foreign direct investment in sub-Saharan African countries increased fourfold from 2003 
to 2008, totalling US$ 199 billion in that period (UNCTAD 2009; see Figure 3). Unfortu-
nately, the only data available concern the extractive sector’s share of cross-border merg-
ers and acquisitions (M&As), which account for about 50 per cent of foreign direct in-
vestment in developing countries (see UNCTAD 2007, xv). Figure 3 shows that the ex-
tractive sector accounted for about 45 per cent of sales in cross-border M&As. 
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Figure 1: Production of mineral and energy commodities in sub-Saharan African countries as 
 a share of global mine production in 2008 
 
Source: Buchholz / Stürmer (s. a.) 
Notes: AO = Angola, RSA = Republic of South Africa, DRC = Democratic Republic of Congo, BW = Botswana, ZW = Zimbabwe, 
 GH = Ghana, GA = Gabon, TZ = Tanzania, ZM = Zambia, ML = Mali, NG = Nigeria, MZ = Mozambique 
Figure 2: Total annual export revenues from mineral and energy commodities for 38 countries 
 in sub-Saharan Africa and metal (dotted line) and fuel (broken line) commodity price 
 indices (2005 = 100) (current US$) 
 
Source: UNSTAT (2010); IMF (2009) 
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Furthermore, UNCTAD reports that a large share of total FDI inflows took the form of 
greenfield prospecting for new reserves  and expansion projects for existing mines. Over-
all, the extractive sector has been the most important sector for foreign direct investment 
in sub-Saharan Africa in recent years, even though FDI inflows have been largely concen-
trated in a few natural-resource-rich countries (see UNCTAD 2007, 36–38; UNCTAD 
2009, 45). 
2.2 Zambia 
Zambia’s copper and cobalt industry sold minerals to the value of over US$ 13 billion and 
benefited from nearly US$ 4 billion of foreign direct investment in the period from 2003 
to 2008. Annual sales revenues average US$ 3000 per km2. 
During the same period, the government raised tax revenues of about US$ 393 million 
from the extractive sector. However, from 2003 to 2006 in particular annual tax revenues 
were quite low. In 2005, for example, the country’s mining industry sold minerals for over 
US$ 1.17 billion, but collected only US$ 11 million in tax. The average ITR for the ex-
tractive sector from 2003 to 2008 was below 2 per cent. 
2.3 Namibia 
Sales of minerals, especially diamonds, were worth about US$ 9.4 billion, and foreign di-
rect investment totalled US$ 2.6 billion in the period 2003-2008. Annual sales averaged 
US$ 1910 per km2 during this time. 
Figure 3: Foreign direct investment in sub-Saharan African countries 
 
Source: UNCTAD (2009); UNCTAD (2008, 43) 
Notes: *Sales in 2007. Includes data for all African countries. 
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Tax revenues totalled about US$ 893 million. Most came from diamond mining. Other 
companies mining zinc, copper, uranium, lead and fluorspar did not pay any royalties from 
2003 to 2006. Corporate income tax from these mining companies was also very low dur-
ing this period. This is astonishing as Namibia is also the world’s fourth largest exporter of 
uranium. In 2005, for example, its export revenues from uranium oxide and other minerals 
totalled over US$ 500 million. According to the Chamber of Mines of Namibia (2008, 89), 
however, the companies exporting these minerals paid no royalties and only US$ 140,000 
in corporate taxes. The average ITR from 2003 to 2008 based on export revenues was 9 
per cent, which is as high as the ITR of Australia’s mining sector. 
2.4 Ghana 
Ghana, a traditional gold-mining country, exported minerals and fuels worth US$ 7.7 bil-
lion and attracted over US$ 4 billion of foreign direct investment inflows from 2003 to 
2008. Annual sales revenues averaged US$ 5401 per km2, only slightly lower than the 
sales revenues per km2 of Australia’s mining sector.  
In contrast, tax revenues totalled only US$ 426 million from 2003 to 2008. The average 
ITR in that period was 5 per cent. The available EITI reports show that many companies 
did not pay any corporate income taxes or ground rate taxes in 2004 and 2005 (Ghana 
Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning, 2007 and 2008; see also Chapter 5.3.3). 
2.5 Australia 
Sales revenues from Australia’s extractive sector totalled US$ 360 billion from 2003 to 
2008. Of this, the mining sector accounted for US$ 260 billion and the oil and gas sector 
for nearly US$ 100 billion. On average, Australia produced minerals and fuels worth over 
US$ 7877 per km2 every year during the commodity boom. Australia was thus able to 
achieve more than twice the sales revenues per km2 of the sub-Saharan African countries. 
Total tax revenues amounted to more than US$ 53 billion from 2003 to 2008. Australia 
achieved an average annual ITR of 9 per cent in the mining sector and 20 per cent in the 
oil and gas sector in that period. For the extractive sector as a whole the ITR was 17 per 
cent. A report by PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC), the consulting firm, indicates that Aus-
tralia is even at the lower end of ITRs for the extractive sector when compared to such 
countries as Canada and South Africa (PwC 2008, 5). 
Overall, the data show that even relatively stable sub-Saharan African countries benefited 
no more than moderately from tax revenues during the commodity boom. They reveal 
strong export revenues from the extractive sector and high inflows of foreign direct in-
vestment, whereas tax revenues were modest, especially in Zambia and Ghana. Compared 
to such classical mining and quarrying countries as Australia, the three case study coun-
tries examined achieved lower tax revenues owing to lower implicit tax rates (except Na-
mibia) and lower sales revenues per km2. 
Let the good times roll? Raising tax revenues from the extractive sector in sub-Saharan Africa ........ 
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3. Potential tax revenues 
First to be examined here are the potential tax revenues of sub-Saharan Africa and our 
case study countries if they achieved the same ITR as Australia.4 
The findings show that sub-Saharan African countries could have obtained tax revenues 
from the extractive sector of over US$ 70 billion in the period 2003-2008 if they had had 
the same ITR as Australia. This would have been the equivalent of about 35 per cent of 
ODA to these countries. 
Ghana could have collected tax revenues of US$ 735 million in the period 2003-2008, 
equivalent to about 10 per cent of its ODA. Namibia could have raised government reve-
nues of US$ 870 million (nearly 90 per cent of ODA), and Zambia nearly US$ 1.4 billion 
(about 21 per cent of ODA) from 2003 to 2008.5  
The potential tax revenues of sub-Saharan African countries if they had achieved similar 
sales revenues per km2 of land surface and similar ITRs to those of Australia have also 
been calculated.  
Sub-Saharan Africa countries could have made over US$ 1.1 trillion in sales revenues 
from minerals and fuels in the period 2003-2008. The potential export revenues for Ghana, 
Namibia and Zambia were US$ 8.2 billion, US$ 28 billion and US$ 26 billion, respec-
tively. 
If we now apply Australia’s ITR to these potential sales revenues, total tax revenues from 
the extractive sector in sub-Saharan Africa could have been US$ 168 billion from 2003 to 
2008. This is more than 80 per cent of cumulative ODA. For Ghana, Namibia and Zambia 
the total potential tax revenues could have been US$ 900 million (11 per cent of ODA), 
US$ 2.8 billion (280 per cent of ODA) and US$ 2.5 billion (37 per cent of ODA), respec-
tively. 
This approach certainly produces no more than a rule-of-thumb figure. First, it is unlikely 
that African countries would be competitive with the same ITR as Australia’s. They pro-
vide less in the way of such public goods as trained staff, infrastructure, a secure environ-
ment, etc. than classical mining countries. But , as is argued later, if these countries pro-
vided a better business environment, they could also levy higher taxes. It is also probable 
that enterprises pay high charges for operating in sub-Saharan African countries, but that 
those payments end up in the pockets of politicians and administrators.  
Furthermore, the data in this paper are based on official sales and export statistics. It is 
likely that these data underestimate the value of the minerals and fuels sold owing to the 
underdeclaration of the value of exports. (see Chapter 5.3) whereas they should be rela-
tively correct in Australia’s case. The data here may therefore even underestimate the po-
tential tax revenues of sub-Saharan African countries. 
                                                 
4 The following data are based on the author’s calculations, unless otherwise stated. 
5 As the three case study countries are largely non-oil producing countries, we have only applied Austra-
lia’s ITR from the mining sector. Ghana will produce considerable amounts of oil in the years ahead, but 
this is not included in our data. 
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4. The challenge of collecting tax revenues from the extractive sector 
Two key factors drive tax revenues from the extractive sector: the implicit tax rate and the 
value of sales revenues. 
Sales revenues, which represent the value of the production of minerals and fuels, form an 
important part of the tax base. They depend on the level of production and the value 
added, which are a function of geological and investment conditions.6 These factors are 
discussed in subsections 5.1 and 5.2. The implicit tax rate is a result of the tax administra-
tion and collection. We analyse these factors in the subsection 5.3. 
4.1 Geology 
Geological conditions determine investment in the extractive sector and the generation of 
sales revenues. Most sub-Saharan African countries are well endowed with mineral re-
sources, but there is a lack of proper public geological surveys. 
A country’s geological endowment is commonly defined in terms of its reserves and re-
sources. Unlike intuition, reserves and resources do not fully define a country’s geological 
potential. Reserves are defined as the known mineral deposits that can be mined economi-
cally with today’s technology. Resources are mineral deposits of intrinsic economic inter-
est in such form, quality and quantity that there are reasonable prospects for eventual eco-
nomic extraction. 
                                                 
6 World market prices also have a major influence on sales revenues. As prices move in strong cycles, 
revenue management is a key challenge for resource-rich sub-Saharan African countries. This important 
aspect is unfortunately beyond the scope of this paper. 
Figure 4: Resources and reserves are not a stock but a flow variable depending on economic 
 costs, technological innovation and discoveries 
 
 
Source: Stürmer / Buchholz (2009) 
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Hence reserves and resources are flow variables rather than stock variables. production 
costs, technological progress and exploration are their major determinants. Rising world 
market prices or technological progress cause reserves and resources to grow. It is there-
fore reasonable to assume that geological deposits are far richer than official reserve and 
resource statistics imply. 
Africa has undergone far less geological exploration than classical mining countries. From 
1991 to 2007, Canada attracted an average of US$ 55 of exploration investment per square 
kilometre, whereas the corresponding figure for Africa was US$ 16 per square kilometre 
(Stürmer / Buchholz 2009, 16). Even advanced sub-Saharan African countries have not 
been entirely explored using modern methods. 
The Fraser Institute conducts an annual survey of metal mining and exploration companies 
to assess how mineral endowments and public policy factors affect exploration investment 
in 65 countries. According to this survey of executives and exploration managers in min-
ing and mining consultant companies operating around the world, most sub-Saharan Afri-
can countries come close to Australia in terms of mineral potential (see Figure 5). 
Geological surveys in sub-Saharan African countries are often poorly equipped and lack 
the resources to undertake exploration. It is mostly private mining companies which ex-
plore for new deposits. As this activity is very costly and risky, their main motive is to ex-
tend production or to replace reserves that have already been mined. Basic geological data 
covering the whole country are mostly lacking or inadequate. 
Figure 5: Mineral potential of Australia and selected sub-Saharan African countries 
 
 
Source: Fraser Institute (2009, 20) 
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As a consequence, governments often have to rely entirely on mineral deposit data pro-
vided by companies. In many cases, they even lack the equipment and knowledge to check 
the information they receive. This puts governments in a poor bargaining position in nego-
tiations concerning new concessions. It also makes it virtually impossible for them to check 
tax statements, since it is difficult to verify information, for example, on reasonable produc-
tion costs without having a detailed knowledge of the underlying geology of a project. 
Overall, sub-Saharan Africa is already one of the world’s most important producers of 
some minerals. It has important reserves of minerals and fuels. At the same time, it can be 
assumed that Africa’s geology is far richer than statistics of reserves and resources reveal 
and sales revenues like those in Australia may be feasible in the long run. 
4.2 Investment conditions 
Investment in the extractive sector and value-adding processing industries is highly capi-
tal-intensive and is effected over long time horizons. The assessment of risk plays a major 
role in investment decisions. Sound and stable public administration, political stability and 
infrastructure are therefore essential if investment is to increase and hence a necessary 
condition for generating tax revenues from the extractive sector in the long run. 
The Fraser Institute’s policy potential index (see Figure 6) measures the effects of gov-
ernment policies on investment. It includes, for example, uncertainty over the administra-
tion, interpretation and enforcement of existing regulations, regulatory duplication and in-
consistencies, taxation, infrastructure, political stability and security. 
Figure 6: Attractiveness of government policies and regulations for the extractive sector in  
 Australia and selected sub-Saharan African countries 
 
Source: Fraser Institute (2009, 10) 
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While Botswana even outperforms Australia, our case study countries Ghana, Namibia, 
and Zambia rank in the middle of the countries evaluated. The DR Congo and Zimbabwe 
are the least attractive countries for investment. This shows that, despite high geological 
potentials in most sub-Saharan African countries, their attractiveness for investment by the 
extractive industry and relevant processing industry varies widely. This also helps to ex-
plain why most sub-Saharan African countries achieve lower sales revenues per km2 than 
such classical mining countries as Australia. 
Another important investment condition is the credit rating of a country. As the govern-
ment has the authority to seize foreign-exchange earnings, impose exchange restrictions, 
fix exchange rates and even expropriate private assets, the credit rating of a country typi-
cally serves as a baseline for evaluating the economic environment surrounding invest-
ment possibilities and as a benchmark for risk evaluation by investors (Ratha / De / Moha-
patra 2007, 1). Good ratings therefore mean that borrowing costs less; bad ratings mean 
high premiums and therefore more costly financing of investment projects. As Table 1 
shows, Botswana is the leading sub-Saharan African country, with A and A2 ratings.  
Ghana and Namibia rank in the middle of the evaluation group. There is no rating for 
Zambia or for countries like the DRC and Zimbabwe. Thus there is still much room for 
improvement of the credit ratings of most sub-Saharan African countries. 
Table 1: Long-term foreign-currency sovereign credit ratings of Australia and selected 
 sub-Saharan African countries 
 
 
 
Source: Standard&Poor’s (2010); Fitch (2010); Moody’s (2010) 
Country  Standard &Poor‘s  Moody´s  Fitch  
 Rating  Date  Rating  Date  Rating  Date  
Australia AAA Nov 2005 AAA Jan 2009 AA+ Feb 2003 
Benin  B  Dec 2007    B  Sep 2004  
Botswana  A  Dec 2009  A2  Mar 2009    
Burkina Faso  B  Aug 2008      
Cameroon  B  Feb 2007    B  Mar 2007  
Cape Verde      B+  Jun 2009  
Gabon  BB-  Nov 2007    BB-  Oct 2007  
Gambia      CCC  Dec 2005  
Ghana  B+  Mar 2009    B+  Mar 2009  
Kenya  B  Aug 2008    B+ Jan 2009 
Lesotho      BB-  Sep 2006  
Madagascar  B-  Mar 2009      
Malawi      B-  Mar 2007  
Mali  B  Nov 2005    B-  Apr 2004  
Mauritius    Baa2  Dez 2007    
Mozambique  B+  Dec 2007    B  Jul 2003  
Namibia      BBB-  Dec 2005  
Nigeria  B+  Aug 2009    BB-  May 2008  
Senegal  B+  Dec 2009      
Seychelles  CCC  Aug 2008      
South Africa  BBB+  Nov  2008  A3  Jul 2009  BBB+  Nov 2008  
Uganda  B+ Dec 2008   B  Aug 2009  
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Infrastructure is also an important investment condition, since the extractive industry relies 
heavily on transport and electricity. Most mineral commodities and semi-finished products 
require such bulk transport facilities as railways, roads, inland waterways and harbours. 
Many African countries currently lack the infrastructure needed for the expansion of the 
extractive sector and related processing industry. For example, the shortage of electricity 
makes the establishment of new mines in Zambia and Ghana difficult. The whole infra-
structure of roads, railways and harbours often has to be built before mining can begin. 
Although prices have been high and geological conditions promising, these problems have 
delayed many projects and hampered the establishment of a processing industry. 
Figure 7 shows that poor infrastructure is seen far less as a deterrent to investment in Aus-
tralia than in Ghana, Namibia and Zambia. Even Botswana lags behind Australia in this 
index. 
The tax regime is a further major investment condition. The Fraser Index shows that a sta-
ble and reliable tax system is important for companies. Especially when combined with 
falling world market prices, rapid changes in the tax system may chase away potential in-
vestors. A stable tax system is also a necessary condition for high implicit tax rates, since 
it lowers the overall project risk from a business perspective. 
According to the Fraser Index (see Table 8), 28 per cent of mining managers see the tax 
system in Ghana as a deterrent to investment or would not pursue investment because of 
this factor. The corresponding figure for Namibia is 41 per cent and for Zambia 51 per 
cent. Such countries as the DR Congo and Zimbabwe fare much worse. Surprisingly, Aus-
tralia ranks behind Botswana and Ghana, with 31 per cent of managers considering its tax 
regime to be a deterrent to investment (Fraser Institute 2009, 71). 
 
Figure 7: Infrastructure as a deterrent to investment in the extractive sector in Australia and  
 selected sub-Saharan African countries 
 
 
Source: Fraser Institute (2009, 76) 
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Figure 8: Taxation regime as a deterrent to investment in the extractive sector in Australia and 
 selected sub-Saharan African countries 
 
 
Source: Fraser Institute (2009, 70) 
Note: Includes personal, corporate, payroll and other taxes, and complexity of tax compliance 
Figure 9: Uncertainty concerning the administration, interpretation and enforcement of existing 
 regulations as a deterrent to investment in the extractive sector in Australia and selected 
 sub-Saharan African countries 
 
 
Source: Fraser Institute (2009, 64) 
Martin Stürmer 
16 German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE) 
Uncertainty concerning the enforcement of regulations in the extractive sector is a major 
obstacle to new investment, as Figure 9 shows. Botswana is again in front of Australia, but 
Ghana, Namibia and Zambia are left far behind. However, Zimbabwe and the DRC again 
do worse than the three case study countries. 
4.3 Tax policy and administration 
The implicit tax rate depends on the tax policy and administration applicable to the extrac-
tive sector. As we have seen, the implicit tax rates of the three case study countries have 
been quite low compared with Australia’s. 
The main underlying problem is corruption, which is usually defined as the “misuse of 
public or entrusted authority for personal gain” (Svensson 2005, 20). This means that 
politicians and tax officials take kickbacks and bribes for reducing the tax burden on cer-
tain companies or embezzle tax payments. Resources accumulated by corruption are either 
used for private purposes or redistributed to clientelist networks, a phenomenon known as 
patronage.7 
According to the World Bank’s International Finance Corporation, “bribes are common in 
EI [extractive industries]” (IFC 2003, 30). As regards the bribing of officials, the oil and 
gas sector and the mining sector rank 3rd and 5th among 19 industrial sectors in the Bribe 
Payers Index (TI 2008, 11). 
The following begins by describing the key features of mining taxation. It will then be 
considered how corruption and a lack of capacity make the collection of taxes difficult. 
4.3.1 Key features of the taxing of the extractive sector 
The extractive sector has a few special features which make a separate tax system usual. 
These features include the size and timescale of investments, high sector-specific risks and 
the instability of world market prices. Mineral rights usually belong to the state, and taxes 
are the price paid for exploiting these public assets (Andrews-Speed 2000, 1.5–1.6). Min-
ing tax regimes differ in the specific combination of taxes, in tax rates and in definitions of 
the tax base. A further key characteristic is the degree of discretion that politicians and of-
ficials have in granting tax exemptions or other special provisions. 
Most countries choose a combination of different taxes and charges to generate revenues 
from the extractive sector. Common taxes are royalties, windfall profit tax, corporate in-
come tax and concession charges. Some governments also receive revenue by participat-
ing in the extractive sector. 
Royalties 
Royalties have historically been the most common instrument for taxing the extractive 
sector and are widely used. Royalties tax the fiscal dues on the basis of either the volume 
(“unit” royalty) or the value (“ad valorem” royalty) of production or exports. There are 
                                                 
7 For a formal study of patronage and the resource curse see Robinson / Torvik / Verdier (2006). 
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many different approaches to the precise calculation of “ad valorem” royalties, since the 
definition of value varies. 
Royalties have the advantage of being relatively easy to assess and apply even though cal-
culation can become complicated if the value is adjusted to omit the cost of transport, han-
dling, etc. (Otto et al. 2006, 52). They also ensure a relatively stable revenue stream to the 
government, since production and sales normally vary much less than profits (Radetzki 
2008, 201). 
For producers, royalties constitute additional costs that have to be paid irrespective of 
profit levels. They can wipe out the entire profit or even result in a loss when world prices 
and therefore pre-tax profits are low. Very high royalties are therefore a major deterrent to 
investment, especially in the case of minerals from low-quality resource endowments and 
of minerals whose world market prices are highly cyclical. Royalties increase the eco-
nomic cut-off rate of a mine and so reduce the economic life of a project (see Tordo 2007, 
37–38; Otto et al. 2006, 51–52; Radetzki 2008, 201–202). 
Corporate income taxes 
Corporate income tax is based on profits, i.e. it is due only when annual revenues exceed 
some measure of costs and allowances. Key variables of corporate income tax are the 
specification of allowable costs, the definition of taxable income and the rate applied. In 
its proportional formulation (a fixed tax rate), corporate income tax is relatively regres-
sive, since the burden it imposes in percentage terms remains the same at different levels 
of profitability. 
In general, corporate income tax avoids the problem associated with royalties of compa-
nies having to pay taxes even though they make losses. For governments, corporate in-
come tax is much more difficult to compute because profits have to be assessed. Further-
more, the yield from corporate income tax fluctuates far more than the yield from royalties 
since profits fluctuate far more than the volume of output or sales. This is especially true 
when a progressive rate is applied (see Tordo 2007, 39; Otto et al. 2006, 52–54; Radetzki 
2008, 202). 
Windfall profit taxes 
Windfall profit taxes cream off an above-normal supposed level of profit by taxing gross 
revenues. As a rule, the tax is levied only when a certain threshold, such as a given world 
market price, is reached. Some countries also apply a progressive tax regime, using 
stepped tax rates linked to world market prices. Zambia is, at present, the only country in 
sub-Saharan Africa that levies a windfall tax under its mining legislation, and that only 
since April 2008. 
Government participation 
Another means of extraction, which has not been included in the data presented here, is 
government participation free of charge or on concessional terms. The government ac-
quires a carried interest and pays for its share out of future earnings from the project, or it 
demands a minority equity share free of charge at the time of the original investment deci-
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sion (known as free carried interest) (see Tordo 2007, 43; Radetzki 2008, 203–204). Divi-
dends from government participation do not, however, play an important role in govern-
ment revenues. In the fiscal year 2007/2008, for example, the Namibian government re-
ceived little more than US$ 1 million in dividends from its 50 per cent stake in Namdeb, a 
large diamond mining company, and a 3 per cent stake in the Rössing uranium mine. This 
is far less than 1 per cent of government revenues from the extractive sector (Chamber of 
Mines of Namibia 2008, 77). 
Various other taxes and charges add to the tax revenues from the extractive sector. They 
include concession charges, duties on imported equipment, payroll taxes, value added 
taxes and environmental taxes. 
The tax regime needs to strike a balance between adequate tax revenues for the govern-
ment and a reasonable level of taxation that still attracts private investment. The strong 
price cycles in mineral commodity markets and the long-term investment cycles in the ex-
tractive sector make striking this balance especially challenging. 
The final feature of the tax regime is the degree of discretion that politicians and officials 
enjoy in granting tax exemptions and other special provisions. In most countries the tax 
regime is codified in mining or tax legislation. Nevertheless, many sub-Saharan African 
states grant the executive, such as the president or ministers, the possibility of concluding 
special tax agreements with companies, especially when licences and concessions are ne-
gotiated. These agreements are typically disclosed and override statutory law. Special tax 
agreements are common in the sub-Saharan African extractive sector.  
4.3.2 Awarding licences and negotiating concessions 
In countries with pronounced ministerial discretion when it comes to taxing the extractive 
sector, the individual design of the tax regime is one of the subjects discussed in negotia-
tions between companies and governments on licences and concessions. The process of 
awarding licences and concessions is therefore a major determinant of the implicit tax rate, 
since the rules of the game are defined at this initial stage. There is a high risk of corrup-
tion and of problems of asymmetric information in negotiations on licences and conces-
sions. 
Some form of licence is the most common form of agreement in the extractive sector, al-
though the name of the arrangement varies from one country to another. A licence is the 
revocable permission granted by a country’s regulatory body to operate a concession (Kol-
stad / Soreide 2009, 221). 
A concession is a legal arrangement for the extraction of minerals and fuels for a deter-
mined period.8 The tax regime may form part of the concession agreement or it may be 
defined in a separate tax agreement with the individual company. The legal details of such 
agreements may include accounting definitions, depreciation and amortisation rules, pro-
visions on state participation, royalty structures and calculation methods, depletion allow-
                                                 
8 For more information on these legal aspects see Rasband et al. (2005). 
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ances, reimbursement of prior exploration expenses, work commitments, tax rates and ex-
emptions from customs duties (Otto et al., 2006 249). 
As these negotiations on concessions and the agreements reached are confidential and often 
subject to no parliamentary or public control, the risk of bribes being offered in exchange for 
favourable tax treatment is high. Furthermore, government officials often lack information 
about the value of the resource, the cost of extraction and other factors, making it impossible 
for them to check the information provided by the company and causing asymmetry of in-
formation at the negotiations. These factors may lead to a low implicit tax rate. 
Zambia, for example, negotiated a number of “development agreements” when it priva-
tised its copper sector in the late 1990s. This was done at a time of historically low world 
copper prices, declining copper production and an unsustainable debt burden. The “devel-
opment agreements” included a reduction in the corporate tax rate from 35 to 25 per cent, 
exemption from customs duty, the reduction of the mineral royalty from 2.0 to 0.6 per 
cent, exemption from excise duty on electricity, an increase in the period over which 
losses could be carried forward and exemption from withholding tax on interest, divi-
dends, royalties and management fees (Di John 2008, 44–45). As a consequence, govern-
ment revenues in the past few years have been fairly low, even though copper prices have 
reached record levels.  
After these agreements had been concluded, the then President, Frederick Chiluba, was 
found guilty of corruption by the High Court in London in 2007 (BBC 2007). The former 
head of the state-owned Zambia Consolidated Copper Mines and a local businessman 
were jailed in 2008 for corruption (The Independent 2008). A World Bank report also re-
ferred to “grave irregularities” in the sale of the mines (Reuters 2008), and the IMF has 
advised Zambia to renegotiate these agreements to provide a “quick and substantial boost” 
(IMF 2008, 16) to the fiscal contributions of the extractive sector. 
Ghana also demonstrates the problems posed by the intransparent and politicised awarding 
of concessions. US and Ghanaian authorities are investigating corruption allegations against 
a Texas oil company, Kosmos, and its Ghanaian partner company, EO. According to the 
Financial Times, EO is owned by two former supporters of former President Kufuor. EO 
initiated the deal with Kosmos to gain control of a promising oil block in exchange for a 3.5 
per cent stake. This stake could be worth US$ 200 million by now. Ghanaian officials sus-
pect that EO used its access to top officials in the former government to take possession of 
the offshore oil block and to win more favourable tax terms. According to a senior Ghanaian 
official, Kosmos’s financing of EO’s costs was “widely regarded in the industry as un-
usual,” especially as the terms of Kosmos’s deal with the government and state oil group 
were “more favourable [to Kosmos] than from any other agreement” (Financial Times 
2010). Kosmos negotiated a favourable royalty rate of 5 per cent, which is at the lower end 
of the 4 to 12.5 % range set in the tax law for oil and gas production (Hackman 2009, 5–6). 
Another report points out that these corruption allegations should be seen from the perspec-
tive of the new Ghanaian government’s efforts to damage the old government’s reputation 
while at the same time putting pressure on Kosmos to sell its stake in the Jubilee Field to the 
Ghanaian state-run oil company on favourable terms (Washington Post 2010). 
 
Martin Stürmer 
20 German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE) 
4.3.3 Tax collection 
A further key problem is the enforcement of existing tax regimes. The magnitude of re-
source revenues gives rise to strong incentives to embezzle revenues by government offi-
cials and to poor tax compliance. 
Most sub-Saharan African tax authorities lack the skills needed to audit the complex ac-
counts of mining companies. Statements on depreciation and the carrying forward of 
losses from other concessions cannot be adequately checked. Companies may misreport 
the volume of minerals and fuels extracted. While international mining companies engage 
high-profile lawyers, the local administration is often unable to check their tax statements 
owing to a lack of knowledge of geology and mining operations. Posts in tax and other 
relevant departments are often distributed not in accordance with meritocratic principles 
but on the basis of kinship or other relationships of social reciprocity, since they provide 
numerous opportunities for corruption. Thus patronage also undermines the skill levels 
and the integrity of institutions (see Fjeldstad 2009). 
Tanzania’s Commissioner for Minerals states: “We have no capacity to look at their 
books. [The companies] can write the books so that third world countries cannot regulate. 
Even the contracts are difficult. I think the mining companies exploit our weaknesses in 
law and capacity” (Lambrechts 2009, 44). In a report on Sierra Leone by the National Ad-
vocacy Coalition On Extractives a former senior civil servant in a government department 
concerned with mining said: “It’s very difficult to tell if they are making profits because 
you have to go by what the companies say. But it is easy to raise operating costs to a fic-
tional level. You can also inflate local costs. What’s lacking in Sierra Leone is the ability 
to monitor and regulate this. You can also easily bribe the mines management officer. It’s 
quite possible for the system to be abused” (National Advocacy Coalition On Extractives 
2009, 7). An additional problem is the lack of uniformity in the pricing of minerals, which 
leads to variations in the calculation of royalty payments. This problem of mis-invoicing 
means that companies either can underdeclare the value of their exports or overstate the 
prices of their imports (of equipment, etc.) in their tax returns. According to Lambrechts, 
mis-invoicing is a common practice, especially in trade among associates of multinational 
corporations (Lambrechts 2009 43). A report by Global Financial Integrity, a project of 
the US-based Centre for International Policy, estimates that between 2002 and 2006 an 
average of US$ 10 billion left Africa every year as a result of trade mis-invoicing (Kar / 
Cartwrigh-Smith 2008 16). Lambrechts suggests that this is likely to be a huge underesti-
mation, given the lack of trade data in Africa and given that this figure does not include 
trade invoices between subsidiaries of the same parent group of companies (Lambrechts 
2009, 43). 
The EITI reports on Ghana for 2004 and 2005 contain good examples of inadequate tax 
administration.9 
First, they reveal huge discrepancies between tax receipts and dividends reported by the 
government and those reported by the companies (Ghana Ministry of Finance and Eco-
nomics 2007, 16; Ghana Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning 2008, 26). 
                                                 
9 Reports for later years have not yet been published. 
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Second, only a minority of companies paid corporate income tax. Owing to favourable 
rules on capital allowances, such as the accelerated depreciation of buildings and plants, 
the carrying forward of losses for up to five years and other deductible expenses, they did 
not need to pay corporate income tax. The EITI report calls for these rules to be reviewed 
if corporate tax is to form a significant portion of total tax payable (Ghana Ministry of Fi-
nance and Economic Planning 2008, 15; Ghana Ministry of Finance and Economic Plan-
ning 2007, 20 and 30–31). The reports also find that mineral royalty payments were 
treated as part of sales costs and therefore as an allowable expense. This has also helped to 
reduce corporate income tax payments, although it is in contravention of the Internal 
Revenue Act (Ghana Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning 2008, 26; Ghana Minis-
try of Finance and Economic Planning 2007, 31). 
Third, all companies paid only the minimum 3 per cent royalty in both years. The rate of 
royalties varies in Ghana between 3 and 12 per cent depending on companies’ operational 
ratios. According to the reports, the Internal Revenue Service has no records of the com-
putation of mining companies’ operational ratios and reconciliations. Nor have any inde-
pendent checks been made of the assays/refinery results provided by mining companies. 
These assays form the basis of the payment of mineral royalties (Ghana Ministry of Fi-
nance and Economic Planning 2008, 24; Ghana Ministry of Finance and Economic Plan-
ning 2007, 28). This means that it is not possible to determine whether or not this low rate 
of royalties was really appropriate or to check statements by companies. 
Fourth, there were significant problems with the uniform pricing of minerals. Ground 
taxes were not paid at all (Ghana Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning 2008, 
13+14). 
Finally, only one of nine major mining companies has submitted its Company Assessment 
Form with statements. This is astonishing, as seven of these companies play an active part 
in the Ghanaian EITI initiative individually and through their participation in the multi-
stakeholder group (Akabzaa / Amidu 2009, 28). 
Overall, the inability of governments to enforce regulations and s because of mis-
invoicing, incorrect tax statements and related corruption makes it difficult for them to 
collect taxes effectively. 
5. The political economy of reforming the tax administration of the extractive
 sector 
Reforming the tax administration of the extractive sector basically consists of improving 
the institutional environment and changing incentives so as to overcome rent-seeking and 
patronage. In general, public financial reform is regarded as a long-term and highly politi-
cal process. There is consensus among development experts that a reform of public finan-
cial management takes 15 to 25 years (Leiderer / Wolff 2007, 9). Referring to public-
sector reform generally, the World Bank’s Independent Evaluation Group (2008, xiv) con-
cludes that the “knowledge of outcomes is imperfect, because of measurement problems 
and the long lag between the start of reforms and seeing their full effects”. 
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The political constraints on public financial reform are due to the fact that key players 
benefit from existing dysfunctional institutions. Political elites have largely shaped the ex-
isting institutions to gain more control over resource rents (Ross 2001). It is unlikely that 
government officials would support or implement reforms that improved democratic ac-
countability and reduced their take (Kolstad / Soreide 2009, 218). Political elites do not 
want to undermine their ability to use resource rents discretionally to foster clientelist ties 
with support groups. Public employees fear losing the opportunity for receiving bribes. 
There is also risk of a “partial reform equilibrium” (Hellman 2003, 204). Van de Walle 
describes experience in African countries of political elites having instrumentalised and 
unevenly implemented reforms such that these reforms “would provide them with new 
kinds of rents, as well as with discretion over the evolution of rents within the economy” 
(Van de Walle 2001, 159). Kolstad and Soreide (2009, 217–218) even warn that the EITI 
could increase patronage and reduce government accountability. The EITI provides for the 
creation of a multi-stakeholder national steering committee to oversee the process. As the 
government appoints this committee, it could become another arena for patronage politics. 
For example, Ghana’s committee consists of fifteen government officials, one representa-
tive of the Chamber of Mines and two representatives of a local civil society organisation. 
The political economy of reform differs widely from country to country owing to differ-
ences in institutions, the initial level of rent-seeking, ethnic fractionalisation and the type 
of commodity involved. Baland and Francois (2000) show that, where corruption is wide-
spread when resource extraction begins, the rent-seeking effect may be more negative. 
According to Hodler (2006), ethnic fractionalisation exacerbates rent-seeking as resource 
rents cause groups to compete more fiercely to appropriate rents. The type of commodity 
also influences rent-seeking. “Point source resources,” such as petroleum and geographi-
cally highly concentrated mineral deposits, appear to have a stronger positive correlation 
with corruption than less concentrated resources, such as agricultural commodities (e.g. 
Leite / Weidmann 1999). Others distinguish between high- and low-value commodities 
(Petermann / Guzman / Tilton 2007). The technical characteristics of extracting a resource 
also change the setting. For example, it may be less difficult to steal and smuggle the eas-
ily mined alluvial diamonds of Sierra Leone than diamonds found in the sea off Namibia, 
the mining of which requires more advanced equipment and organisation (Torvic 2007). 
Kolstad and Soreide (2009, 225) therefore conclude that, to target corruption in the re-
source sector, a thorough understanding of key local structural features, and the incentives 
of agents, is needed. The World Bank’s Independent Evaluation Group comes to the con-
clusion that public-sector reform needs strong country ownership, reforms tailored to spe-
cific countries and a realistic time-frame. Leiderer and Wolff (2007, 9) point out that, as 
public-sector reforms are an endogenous process with political and institutional determi-
nants, they basically have to be initiated, effectively implemented and overseen by devel-
oping countries. The role of donor countries can only be to provide incentives, to support 
the formulation of effective reform strategies in a dialogue and to support implementation 
financially and technically. 
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6. Policy options 
The following considers some of the policy options open to resource-rich countries and 
donor countries for acquiring tax revenues from the extractive sector. The focus will be on 
proposals relating to the tax administration and system. It is important to bear in mind that 
there is no “one-size-fits-all recipe” because institutions and incentives differ from one 
country to another. 
6.1 Resource-rich sub-Saharan African countries 
1. Setting up autonomous units for the administration of the extractive sector. The 
government could set up one unit for negotiating licences and another for collecting taxes. 
Both units should seek to focus solely on the handful of companies involved in the extrac-
tive sector and could be separated from the Ministry of Mines and the Ministry of Finance, 
respectively. They could be set up in close cooperation with international consultancies 
and international development agencies. 
2. Employing international consultants in the short term. To ensure a clear break from 
patronage, the staff of these two autonomous units might consist mainly of international 
consultants and expatriate advisors. They would thus contribute to effective change by 
building integrity and professionalism in the organisation. They would also provide skills 
in the granting of licences and the raising of taxes and increase the government’s bargain-
ing power vis-à-vis companies. 
3. Promoting capacity-building and anti-corruption measures in the long term. The 
number of local staff in these two units could be increased carefully and gradually. The 
tasks of the international consultants could include the transparent recruitment and training 
of new local staff. In general, international consults should work closely with local staff to 
enable the latter accumulate skills. Employment and promotion could be based on meri-
tocratic principles. There should be close scrutiny to prevent corruption and strong incen-
tives to uncover illegal practices. Posts should be rotated from time to time. 
4. Introducing an independent monitoring system. A special unit in an independent na-
tional accounting office could check the work of the two administrative units. A medium-
term reform of the judicial system might enforce anti-corruption laws and ensure severe 
punishment for corruption. 
5. Accountable and transparent granting of licences. A database containing information 
on tender participants, prices, the selection criteria, etc. could make the tendering process 
more transparent. Freedom of information bills could provide for citizens to have broad 
access to information. 
6. Stopping the practice of secret and individually negotiable tax deals. Tax deals and 
tax receipts from the extractive industry could be opened up to public and parliamentary 
scrutiny. All mining tax rates and tax allowances could be legislated for in substantive law 
and merely confirmed in the extracting licences. 
7. Passing national laws to enhance tax disclosure. Countries could require all extrac-
tive industry companies, including the subsidiaries of multinational companies incorpo-
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rated in their jurisdictions by law, to report profits, expenditures, taxes, fees and commu-
nity grants paid in each financial year on a national basis (Lambrechts 2009, 59–60). 
6.2 Donor countries and international development agencies 
1. Making voluntary transparency initiatives mandatory. The EITI and related initia-
tives provide a useful stimulus for the improvement of transparency in the extractive sec-
tor, but they are voluntary. The EITI embraces 35 countries, three of which have so far 
completed the validation process and gained the status of “compliant country”. The others 
are still in the process of validation or have have signaled their intent to implement the 
EITI (July 2010). Donor countries and international development agencies could make the 
data required by EITI reports mandatory for their annual assessments and international 
data reports. 
2. Rethinking ODA and other financial support in the case of sustained non-
cooperation. Donor countries and international development agencies might rethink their 
strategies in countries with a flourishing extractive industry, but notoriously low tax reve-
nues. They should offer support for the reform of the tax administration of the extractive 
sector. Where a lack of political will is persistently shown, donor countries could question 
their engagement and eventually reallocate it to other countries (see von Haldenwang / 
Krause 2009). 
3. Providing funds for independent technical assistance. Bilateral donors and interna-
tional development organisations could scale up their financial assistance to improve the 
granting of licences, the capacity to monitor and audit the accounts of extractive compa-
nies and to review their tax regimes and administration. African governments could use 
this finance to purchase legal and other technical assistance from any service provider of 
their choice (see Lambrechts 2009, 60). 
4. Capacity-building in the areas of geological know-how and tax administration. 
Donor countries and international development organisations could support national geo-
logical surveys and mining inspectorates to ensure that accessible basic geological, mining 
and mineral market data are adequate. Sub-Saharan African and donor countries could co-
operate closely in the training of geologists, mining engineers, mineral economists and tax 
administrators. Frequent student and employee exchanges between higher education and 
tax administration institutions would support this undertaking. 
5. Scaling up the EITI++ initiative. The World Bank and donor countries could further 
reinforce what was once known as the “EITI++” initiative. The aim of this initiative is to 
provide training and advice to improve the quality of contracts, monitoring operations and 
the collection of taxes and royalties.  As China and India have become major players in 
Africa’s extractive sector, it is important for them to be closely involved in this initiative. 
6. Passing national laws to enhance tax disclosure of nationally listed companies. Na-
tional governments could enact laws requiring companies listed on national stock ex-
changes and their subsidiaries to publish their payments to foreign governments for the 
development of oil, gas and mineral reserves. In July 2010, for example, the USA enacted 
the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, which includes a pro-
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vision requiring oil, gas and mining companies registered with the US Securities and Ex-
change Commission to publish their payments to foreign countries and to the US govern-
ment. 
7. Enhancing international tax disclosure by companies. Donor countries could lobby 
the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB)10 for an amendment to international 
accounting standards applicable in the extractive industries requiring them to report on 
their profits, expenditures, taxes, fees and community grants paid each financial year on a 
country-by-country basis (Lambrechts 2009, 60). Such a systemic reform would enable 
the public and governments to track tax payments, since most companies are subsidiaries 
of transnational corporations incorporated in western countries and listed on international 
stock exchanges. 
The IASB has already established a project team for the extractive industry. In its latest 
discussion paper on this issue, the project team gives an initial assessment of the costs and 
benefits of a proposal from the Publish What You Pay (PWYP) campaign. It comes to the 
conclusion that further study is required before it can be concluded whether the country-
by-country disclosure of payments to governments is justifiable on cost-benefit grounds 
(IASB 2009, 140–159).11 In May 2010 further consultations on the issue were being held 
at the IASB. 
 
 
                                                 
10 The IASB is responsible for the development and publication of international financial reporting stan-
dards (IFRSs). It is part of the IASC Foundation, an independent, not-for-profit private-sector organisa-
tion working in the public interest, whose principal objective is to develop a single set of high-quality, 
understandable, enforceable and globally accepted international financial reporting standards. Thus its 
main aim is to determine the extent to which the disclosure of information is useful to capital providers 
on the basis of a cost-benefit analysis (IASB 2009, 143–144). 
11 The IASB planned to publish the discussion paper prepared by the project team, together with a request 
for views, in the first quarter of 2010. After publication of the request for views, the Board was to make 
a decision on adding the project to its active agenda. In this case, an exposure draft would take at least 
18 months to develop, and a final international financial reporting standard would take at least another 
12 months to develop (IASB 2010). 
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